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Developing Countries have been particularly worried by the single-market-program
since the EC absorbs more than a third of their total exports. At present, fears of a
Fortress Europe and negative net trade effects for DCs appear to be unfounded,
however. DCs have proven to be competitive in a number of labour and capital
intensive industries in the past; and it is rather unplausible that European suppliers
will gain a competitive edge in these industries as a result of the single market. With
the exception of agricultural economies specialized on specific products, the net
welfare effect of EC-1992 will, therefore, be either positive or at worst zero for most
DCs.





In the mid-1980s, the announcement of the single-market-program designed to bring
free movement of people, goods, capital, and services within the Community by
January 1st 1993 was thought to be the appropriate answer to help overcome the
then diagnosed loss of competitiveness of European suppliers on world markets. In
turn, the single-market-program appears to have stimulated the Community's strong
economic growth in the late 1980s. As a consequence, the economic friction
resulting from the implementation process seem to have been underestimated, and
the potential gains probably overestimated. With the single market in place, the
present economic downturn with rising unemployment and necessary structural
adjustments in several highly subsidized sectors may increase the risk that more
protectionist trade policies will be taken in the future. Both aspects, the prospective
improvement of the competitive position of European suppliers on world markets,
and a possible Fortress Europe, worry competitors from third countries, and
especially developing countries (DCs). Up to now, however, both fears by and large
appear to be unfounded.
First, the single market is far from being fully completed despite the end-1992
deadline. E.g., some industries were left out of the original legislative program
because they were thought to be too sensitive (e.g., telecommunications and
energy), some measures such as passport checks will vanish with delay, some
measures such as the value-added-tax system are in a state of transition (due for
review in 1996), many of the technical standards needed to make the rules on
technical harmonization work are not in place, state aid for certain industries
continues to distort markets, and the huge public procurement market is still
governed by national bias [The Economist, 1993]. Hence the productivity boosting
effect of European integration, whatever its actual size may be, will spread out over a
relatively long time span, thus giving competitors from third countries a chance to
respond to changing conditions of competition: The completion of the single market
is a process, not a deadline.
Second, fears of a protectionist threat of the single market have not
materialized to date, apart from certain sensitive areas where EC wide arrangements
with foreign suppliers or new Community restrictions are to replace previous national
restrictions (cars, bananas, fish, steel). I.e., there is little evidence of any major
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intensification of protectionist measures on behalf of the EC in the industrial sphere,
and the Commision has indicated that only for a handful of producers some form of
Community measures would be needed [GATT, 1993]. Of course, this is not to deny
that EC markets for, e.g., agricultural products, iron and steel, and textiles and
clothing remain heaviliy protected.
In the years ahead, the single market is to continue with enlargements of EC
membership (EFTA countries), further association agreements (Central and Eastern
Europe), and the eventual establishment of an Economic and Monetary Union aimed
at in the Treaty of Maastricht. The EC is well on its way of becoming a regional
trading bloc encompassing most of Europe. Against this background, it is hardly
surprising that non-Europeans, and in particular developing countries (DCs), are
anxious about their access to the large European single market, shifts in
comparative advantages generated by economic integration, and a possible reversal
of international capital flows which a Europe 'without borders' may entail. Since EC
member countries have traditionally been important trading partners of DCs changes
of demand, market accessibility and investment flows will have an immediate impact
on the growth prospects of these countries, especially when they have followed an
outward-oriented development strategy such as many Asian DCs.
This paper looks at the expected trade and growth effects of the single market
program (EC-1992 for short) and related changes currently under way in Europe.
Towards this end, the scope of institutional change in the EC will be summarized in
section 2. The completion of the single market for goods, services, capital, and
labour (the so-called four freedoms) goes hand in hand with an enlarged network of
policy coordination agreements with the EFTA countries and countries in Central and
Eastern Europe. The emergence of the European Economic Space and the
association of formerly centrally planned economies has increased trade policy
discrimination among trading partners and has rendered the trade policy regime of
the EC even more complex and non-transparent than it already was prior to 1993
[Hiemenz et al., 1990]. The expected growth effects of EC-1992 in EC member
countries are discussed in section 3. Section 4 deals with the implications of
European economic integration for developing countries. The overall conclusion is
not overly pessimistic: developing countries do not need to fear an erosion of their
trading opportunities in an integrating Europe if they respond in a flexible manner to
the institutional changes that are being implemented in the 1990s.2. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF EC-1992
The basic rationale of European economic integration was internal trade
liberalisation. Intra-EC trade was successively liberalised in three major stages. The
first, starting in 1958, was the elimination of customs duties and quantitative
restrictions. It was completed on 1 July 1968 with the introduction of a common
external tariff. The second, between 1973 and 1986, witnessed the stepwise
enlargement of the EC from six to twelve member countries and the conclusion of
various free trade and preferential trading agreements with neighbouring
industrialised countries (mainly EFTA) as well as DCs around the Mediterranean
Sea. During the 1970s and early 1980s, however, global economic setbacks, rising
inflation, surging oil prices and problems of structural adjustment worked against a
further deepening of economic integration among EC members. In 1985, in the so-
called White Paper, a comprehensive and ambitious approach was launched to
revitalise the integration process: the completion of the single market by the end of
1992 which marks the third and last stage of internal trade liberalisation.
Having accomplished a free trade area and a customs union, the 1992-project
meant the establishment of a common market without internal borders and border
controls. To achieve this, EC member countries primarily had to liberalise factor
movements and trade in services within the EC. Concerning manufactures, trade
had already been liberalised earlier except for a relatively small number of products
(including those covered by the MFA) for which national quotas were still existing.
Such quotas had to be removed. Furthermore, market access is to be based on the
country-of-origin principle. Certain technical norms and standards, public
procurement and the provision of subsidies as well as VAT treatment, however, were
harmonised within the EC. It is not clear, though, how and when these policy
changes will be fully implemented and how suppliers from third countries may fit into
the new framework [for details, see Langhammer, Dicke, 1991].
The expected welfare gains from the completion of the single market were
estimated in two studies commissioned by the EC Commission, the famous Emerson
and Cecchini Reports [Emerson et al., 1988; Cecchini, 1988]. According to these
studies, the removal of technical barriers to trade, the abolition of border controls,
more competition in public procurement and the opening of major services markets
would boost the EC's GDP by between 2.5 and 6.4 per cent over a period of roughly
5 years. These results are heavily debated. Critical comments focus on the true size
of gains from integration, in particular the neglect of effects from structural
adjustment, and the at most parenthetical reference to the impact on the rest of the
world. The latter led to the perception shared by many DCs that the EC may try torestrict the access of outsiders to the benefits of integration by impeding external
competition, i.e. by erecting a Fortress Europe.
The economic landscape of Europe will continue to change considerably after
the completion of the single market. The Maastricht Treaty has laid the groundwork
for further integration deepening by establishing the timetable and the conditions for
a European Monetary Union to be implemented until the end of the decade.
Negotiations on the formation of a European Economic Space with the EFTA
countries, and association agreements with formerly socialist countries in Central
and Eastern Europe pave the way towards integration widening. The final objective
of closer economic cooperation between the EC and other European countries is
enlargement of EC membership although neither the countries desiring full
membership nor the respective time frame for their accession have been identified.
2.1 The European Monetary Union (EMU)
The EMU represents the last step of European economic integration, i.e. the
transformation of the common market into an economic union. This step is
considered to be a precondition for a political union, the ultimate objective of
European integration. The EMU essentially means the introduction of a single
European currency issued by a common, independent Central Bank. The elimination
of exchange rate risks among EC member countries is expected to reduce
transaction costs in intra-EC trade and - together with stability-oriented and
disciplined budgetary policies - to improve the allocative efficiency of the European
economy. The plan dates back to 1988, when the heads of state commissioned a
report on ways and means to achieve economic and monetary union. The so-called
Delors-report, proposed a three-stage plan towards monetary union, with the last
stage entailing a common currency and assignment of full monetary and economic
competences to EC institutions. Agreement on this proposal was reached in the
Maastricht Treaty of December 1991, providing for the introduction of a common
currency sometime in 1997-1999, depending on progress in economic convergence
in the interim.
The EMU builds on the accomplishments of the Common Market and the
European Monetary System (EMS). In preparing for the Common Market, all
restrictions on capital flows among EC member countries were abandoned. The
EMS has narrowed exchange rate fluctuations among the currencies of member
countries to a small band. The eight core countries adhering to this mechanism were
joined by Spain and the United Kingdom on 20 June 1989 and 8 October 1990.Greece and Portugal remained outside the EMS. Events during the last months of
1992 have, however, clearly indicated the fragility of an exchange rate mechanism in
the absence of coordinated monetary and fiscal policies. High rates of inflation and
fiscal deficits in Italy and the United Kingdom coupled with a tight monetary policy in
Germany caused substantial pressure on the former countries' currencies requiring a
major realignment of exchange rates. Both countries suspended their participation in
the EMS and have not rejoined the mechanism by now.
By the end of 1996, the heads of the EC governments are to decide by a
(qualified) majority vote whether a majority of member countries is ready for a
currency union. In the case of a positive verdict, the currency union could be
introduced for these countries from the beginning of 1997 onwards. In the case of a
negative verdict, countries which are then deemed to be ready for the union will have
to replace their currencies by a common one at the beginning of 1999. Yet, the
criteria are non-binding, they merely provide a basis for a recommendation of the EC
Commission to the Council of the heads of EC governments, which is free in its final
decision. Hence, the criteria need not constrain the macroeconomic policy of
member countries very much.
2.2 The European Economic Space (EES)
The completion of the single market was to coincide with integration widening
towards the EFTA countries in the framework of an EC-EFTA agreement on the
formation of a European Economic Space (EES). EC and EFTA markets have been
connected by special economic agreements since 1972/73, when Austria, Finland,
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland concluded parallel bilateral
Free Trade Agreements with the EC. In these FTAs, the EC and each EFTA member
individually agreed on a timetable to abolish tariffs on most industrial goods by the
end of 1977. For some sensitive products, e.g. paper and steel, temporary quotas
remained and tariff removal was delayed until. To help solving problems caused by
differing trade policies regarding third countries, a system of rules of origin was
developed. The main features of the EC-EFTA FTAs have also been maintained in
the agreement on the EES: exclusion of agriculture, special provisions for some
sensitive products, differential treatment of third countries, and rules of origin.
The formation of the EES dates back to April 1984 when ministers of the EC
and EFTA agreed on a second generation of EC-EFTA initiatives. In May 1992, EC
and EFTA countries finally concluded an agreement on the establishment of the EES
on 1 January 1993, concurrently with the completion of the single market. Incompliance with the original objectives, the agreement covers the implementation of
the four freedoms, the EC competition policy, special measures concerning e.g.
social policy, R&D, consumer as well as environmental protection, and institutional
adjustments.
Despite its far-reaching institutional and legal implications, the EES is in the
final analysis no more than a free trade arrangement with extensions concerning the
free mobility of capital and labour. EC and EFTA countries maintain their respective
trade regimes towards third countries. Therefore, rules of origin and border controls
are inevitable and will continue to impede EFTA-EC trade in contrast to intra-EC
trade. The agreement also includes exemptions from the free trade/free mobility
principle in sectors considered as particularly sensitive for individual EFTA countries
such as in fishery (Iceland, Norway), transport (Austria, Switzerland), as well as
labour mobility and financial markets (Switzerland). The special provisions and the
exclusion of agriculture maintain a degree of market segmentation and reduce
integration benefits. For this reason, it is hardly surprising that three EFTA countries,
Austria, Finland, and Sweden, have applied for full EC membership, while Norway is
likely to do so soon.
Summarising from the point of view of third countries, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the formation of the EES is not really a decisive event. Conditions of
market access for third countries will hardly change in any significant way and, in the
medium term, the EES will vanish when all major EFTA countries (except
Switzerland) become full members of the EC.
2.3 Integration of Central and Eastern Europe
The former member countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
in Central and Eastern Europe can be considered as "natural" trading partners of
Western Europe. Historical trade patterns from the inter-war period as well as the
simulation of "normal" trade patterns using so-called gravity models (with economic
size and distance as the major determinants of the direction of trade) suggest that
Central and Eastern European countries would direct the largest share of their
exports to Western Europe. Some estimates say that about 75 per cent of Central
and Eastern European exports would normally be directed to Western Europe
[Havrylyshyn, Pritchett, 1991]. Actually, however, trade flows between the two
groups of countries were much smaller and even declined in the 1980s. The two
main reasons for the dismal trade relations were the limited and deteriorating supply
capacity of CMEA countries and high barriers to trade in Western Europe. In terms ofmarket access to Western Europe, CMEA countries faced tariffs as well as a wide
range of quantitative restrictions. And therefore, ranged at the bottom of the pyramid
of trade preferences granted by the EC.
A liberalisation of East-West trade began in mid-1988 - even prior to the
ultimate demise of socialism - when the EC signed trade and cooperation
agreements with CMEA countries These agreements focus on trade in industrial
products, excluding coal and steel (ECSC products) and textiles. To facilitate the
transition to a market economy the EC abolished all quantitative restrictions
specifically applied against these countries (except for the Soviet Union where a
stepwise procedure was adopted) and temporarily lifted all other QRs until 1992. In
addition, the EC granted GSP treatment to the smaller countries of Central and
Eastern Europe - to Poland and Hungary since 1990 and to Bulgaria and the former
CSFR since 1991.
Economic cooperation between the EC and CMEA countries was further
intensified after the collapse of central planning. Within the unprecedentedly short
period of one year the EC negotiated association agreements with the CSFR, Poland
and Hungary. These so-called 'Europe Agreements' were signed on 16 December
1991, effectively dividing the CMEA countries into two groups, the Central European
countries (Poland, Hungary, the former CSFR) and the Eastern European countries
including Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and the former USSR republics (now CIS).
The Europe Agreements were intended to actively support the transformation
process, and their ultimate objective is to lead to full membership of the Central
European countries [Langhammer, 1992a]. The agreements do not only include
preferential trade policies but also measures of economic cooperation and
institutional changes such as a partial adjustment of the legal framework in the
Central European countries to accommodate EC rules and regulations.
The most remarkable feature about the agreements are the concessions the
EC has granted for trade in agricultural products, textiles and clothing as well as iron,
steel and coal. For the first time, the EC has facilitated access to markets of highly
sensitive products in which the associated countries are likely to be or become
competitive. This relatively sweeping trade liberalisation puts the former CSFR,
Poland, and Hungary in the hierarchy of trade preferences on a level roughly
comparable to EFTA countries and certainly ahead of all DCs.
As compared to the former CSFR, Hungary, and Poland, the process of
democratisation and economic transformation is much less advanced and
surrounded by many political uncertainties in the other Eastern European countries.They are, on average, less developed, and economic fragility is reflected in high
rates of inflation and rapidly declining output. The EC has assumed a much more
cautious approach towards these countries and has so far offered only some of the
financial and trade privileges granted in the Europe Agreements [Langhammer,
1992b]. Concerning trade policies, the EC has lifted quotas and improved the GSP
coverage. In 1992, the EC has started negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania on a
similar type of institutionalised relations as the Europe Agreements. However, it is
very likely that in the new agreements with the Baltic states, Albania, Romania, and
Bulgaria, the EC will deny the explicit reference to future full membership made in
the preamble of the Europe Agreements. As a result, these agreements would be
comparable to those negotiated with Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey in the 1960s and
1970s.
Among the Eastern European countries, the 15 successor states to the former
USSR (CIS) represent a special case. During the cold war, bilateral trade with the
EC was not only very much restricted through EC import quotas, both Community-
wide and on the national level, but perhaps even more so on the EC export side for
security reasons (COCOM). Since 1989 many quotas against USSR-originating
goods were lifted under a ten-year trade and commercial cooperation agreement
with the former USSR (December 1989). All specific EC quantitative restrictions were
to be eliminated by the end of 1995 at the latest, except for a limited number of
products rated as sensitive [Gatt, 1991]. After December 1991, the EC had found it
difficult to formulate new policies for trade relations with the CIS. By January 1993,
the GSP status has finally been granted to CIS products, thus putting the CIS on the
same footing as other DCs in the pyramid of trade preferences. Yet, greater trade
concessions will be without much substance because the CIS states predominantly
export non-dutiable items such as primary commodities.
3. CURRENT FEATURES OF INTEGRATION
The economic integration of the EC is proceeding on several fronts. Besides
completing the Internal Market, this refers to macroeconomic policy coordination
within the envisaged European Monetary Union (EMU) in the first place. The Treaty
of Maastricht also entails elements of policy coordination in the field of social and
industrial policies. Finally, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is under review and
some initial policy adjustments have taken place already. In the following, however,
the focus is on the expected effects of economic integration on EC member
countries, and the remaining trade barriers against competitors from outside the EC.10
These topics provide the background for an assessment of the consequences of the
1992 program on non-members of the EC, especially DCs.
3.1 Expected Effects on Member Countries
Shortly after the EC Commission had launched the White Paper in 1985, several
attempts were made to quantify the expected effects of the 1992 program for
member countries in terms of economic gains. The starting point for the intensive
and ongoing debate was provided by a major EC-funded research project on the
"Cost of Non-Europe", published in two volumes by the EC Commission [1988]. The
potential welfare effects were estimated on the assumption that internal market
barriers would be removed by end-1992. The set of calculations presented in
Table 1 is based on partial equilibrium models. The bottom line of this micro-
economically oriented evaluation is given by an additional 2.2 per cent of GDP (line
(3)). This figure is derived from a narrow conception of the benefits of removing
internal market barriers such as customs formalities and delays (line (1)), as well as
removing discrimination in public procurement, divergent national standards and
regulations, and restrictions on business activities in services and manufacturing
(line (2)). The figure captures only the direct welfare effects of liberalisation - induced
cost reductions on producers, consumers and governments.
The gain in GDP, to be achieved within about five years, is expected to
increase to 4.3-6.4 per cent if enhanced competition in an integrated EC market is
taken into account. Indirect GDP effects are attributed to the adjustment of economic
agents to the new business environment. The range of estimation results is partly
due to alternative primary sources of information on cost reductions (variants A and
B in the Table). More relevant in explaining the differences are alternative
methodological approaches to evaluating competitivity effects (variants I and II):
A relatively modest GDP increase is achieved if a so-called price convergence
approach is applied to calculate the indirect market integration effects (line (7)). The
underlying assumption is that the observed price dispersion between EC countries is
reduced or abolished (depending on sector-specific characteristics) after the removal
of non-tariff barriers. However, it is not considered that prices may fall below the
lowest price observed before and that the drop in prices results in higher demand
and output.11
Table 1 - Estimates of the Total Economic Gains from Completing the Internal
Market
a (per cent of GDP at 1985 prices)
(1) Removing barriers affecting trade only
(2) Removing barriers affecting all production
(3) Total direct effects (1) + (2)
(4) Economies of scale from restructuring and increased
production
(5) Competition effects on X-inefficiency and monopoly
rents
(6) Total market integration effects
0 (4) + (5)
(7) Alternative measure of market integration effects
0
(8) Total direct and market integration effects
- Variant I (3) + (6)























aAII estimates according to partial equilibrium methods; based on benchmark data for 1985. -
DVariants A and B use alternative primary sources of information. -
 cDifferences due to alternative
approaches to evaluating competitivity effects.
Source: Emerson et al. [1988].
The gain in GDP increases significantly (to 5.8-6.4 per cent) if the above
omissions are taken into account, which is attempted by the so-called welfare gains
approach (lines (4)-(6)). The focus is on the effects of industrial restructuring and
enhanced efficiency, e.g. by the exploitation of economies of scale by gaining
experience of how to produce most efficiently (so-called learning curve effects), by
eliminating management inefficiencies, and by improving the capacity to innovate.
The Emerson Report [Emerson et al., 1988] stresses that the various
empirical estimates are consistent, but, at the same time, "very approximate". The
underlying assumptions and judgements have been the major subject of the ongoing
debate on the growth and welfare effects of the 1992 program. On the one hand, it is
argued that the potential welfare gain due to dynamic growth effects is
underestimated. On the other hand, the discussion has also raised some critical
points suggesting an overly optimistic bias of the Emerson Report.
A debatable point in these calculations refers to the role of economies of
scale. The fairly strong contribution of this factor, amounting to one third of the
overall GDP effect according to line (4) in Table 1, has been criticized. It has been
doubted that the average size of firms in EC countries is substantially below the cost-
minimising optimum [Geroski, 1989]. Furthermore, the extent to which potential
economies of scale can be realised not only depends on the size of the enlarged12
internal EC market, but also on the preferences of consumers. E.g., the larger the
number of varieties wanted by consumers, the smaller the importance of economies
of scale.
Another problem with the Emerson Report and the related background studies
is the fundamentally partial equilibrium nature of the models applied. General
equilibrium analyses have shown that the positive GDP effects tend to be overstated
by partial equilibrium models [Gasiorek et al, 1992; Haaland, Norman, 1992].
Assuming full employment, industries with increasing returns to scale would draw on
labour from sectors with constant returns. The production of the latter would drop as
a result. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the rather modest increases in output
revealed for industries that are considered to be most susceptible to integration
gains would gross up to the above mentioned gain in GDP of about 5 per cent
[Winters, 1992]. On the other hand, however, the CGE models applied so far do not
fully capture gains from deregulation so that they tend to underestimate the '1992'
effects.
Particularly the dynamic effects of '1992' are difficult, if not impossible to
quantify. First attempts to evaluate the growth effects of the 1992 program suggest
that "they are likely to dwarf the one-time gains" [Baldwin, 1989], on which the
Emerson Report focuses. In addition to the initial static effect, this study provides
evidence pointing to a substantial growth bonus in the medium-run. The static
efficiency gains induce higher savings and investment. Extra investment causes an
increase of output, which is likely to be of the same order of magnitude as the one-
time effect given in the Emerson Report. Arguments derived from the so-called
endogenous growth theory suggest that growth rates may even be permanently
increased. This latter effect, which is expected to be the largest of all, depends on
the realisation of economies of scale, however. With scale economies, "1992 might
add between 0.2 and 0.9 percentage points to the EC's long-term growth rate"
[Baldwin, 1989]. This is a large number, given that the "normal" growth rate is in the
range of two per cent.
Of course one has to remember that all these modelling exercises are subject
to wide margins of error. Most importantly, the growth effects from liberalising trade
in services which was highly regulated prior to 1993 are largely ignored. In addition,
the fiercer competition under internal market conditions can be expected to lead to
various behavioural changes (especially with regard to investment), which largely
escape quantitative analysis. Examples are: the reorganisation of production and
management to reduce X-inefficiencies, greater specialisation because of a finerBibliothek des Instituts
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division of labour, the relocation of production facilities to exploit locational
advantages, and intensified efforts at technological innovation. In addition, political-
economy arguments suggest favourable growth effects to result from the removal of
internal market barriers. Free intra-EC trade may undermine the power base of
national lobbies so that inefficiency and inflexibility can no longer be sustained
[Waelbroeck, 1990]. All in all, it depends primarily on the course of economic policies
at the EC and the national level whether the higher potential welfare gains will be
fully realised.
In most respects, a quantitative assessment of the impact of the Common
Market is hardly feasible. What is quantifiable reveals only small overall gains. E.g.,
recent examples of CGE model simulations analysing the '1992' effects on the
industrial structure and trade flows may be summarised as follows [Gasiorek et al,
1992; Haaland, Norman, 1992]-.
- EC output expands in all industries modelled as imperfectly competitive, but only
by modest amounts if market segmentation persists. Output expansion is
enhanced considerably if EC markets are integrated. It appears unlikely,
however, that the output expansion in the industries considered would gross up to
a GDP effect of around 5 per cent as foreseen by the EC Commission.
- The differences across industries depend on several structural characteristics.
The industrial structure in the EC is expected to change in favour of sectors with
greater economies of scale and a high proportion of output traded within the EC.
Relatively large output effects are revealed in highly concentrated industries, in
which the pro-competitive effect of intra-EC liberalisation is supposed to be
greatest. Furthermore, the output expansion is expected to be strongest in
engineering and other skill-intensive industries; in contrast, output effects are
expected to remain fairly small in labour-intensive industries.
- As a corollary, the effect on external EC trade is most pronounced in industries
where EC output grows the most: EC exports to the rest of the world are
expected to rise by 30 per cent , e.g., for metalliferrous products, non-metallic
mineral products, transport equipment and food products. The external EC
imports in the same sectors are expected to fall by 14 - 40 per cent.
In summary, CGE analyses predict relatively large sectoral production and
trade effects associated with imperfect competition but only modest effects for the
overall EC GDP (in the range of 2 per cent). Resources will be shifted into rapid-
growth industries, typically R & D and skill-intensive engineering sectors. The overall14
degree of trade diversion is likely to remain modest once the import-stimulating
income effects of completing the Internal Market are taken into account. Despite the
plausibility of the latter results, the specification of the CGE models must be
subjected to important qualifications. The classification of industries into perfectly
and, imperfectly competitive sectors is based on arbitrary indicators such as
concentration ratios. Moreover, the assumption of a uniform reduction of trade costs
by 2.5 per cent is highly unrealistic as was shown already in the Cecchini Report.
Both qualifications are particularly relevant for services which are generally treated
as perfectly competitive in the CGE models. For these reasons, production effects in
manufacturing are most likely to be overestimated, while they are definitely
underrated in services. This implies that the conclusions for trade creation and trade
diversion would also differ significantly from alternatively modelled CGE models.
3.2 Remaining Trade Barriers
The external trade policy of the EC can still be characterised by instability,
discrimination, lacking transparency, and conceptual deficiencies.
1 Differences in
protection levels among individual EC member countries remained sizeable until the
early 1990s, since important non-tariff trade barriers (NTBs) were handled by
national governments. In many cases, attempts to circumvent national barriers by
"indirect" imports via less restrictive EC member countries were frustrated by the EC
Commission's authorisation to restrict intra-EC trade according to Art. 115 of the
EEC Treaty. The decline of Art. 115 authorisations until 1990 to roughly one third of
the 1980-figure indicates that the process of transforming national NTBs into a
common protection level was well under way. By July 1992, the number of
surveillance measures authorized by the Commission under Article 115 had dropped
to three; likewise, the number of intra-EC trade restrictions in force dropped from 128
in 1988 to only three in mid-1992 [EC Commision, 1993]. From a sectoral
perspective, the huge majority of restrictions has been imposed on EC imports of
textiles.
It is difficult to see how regional supply targets under the MFA or other
voluntary restraint agreements would in future be applied effectively. To the extent
that technical requirements are harmonized and EC wide approval is introduced,
internal substitutes for border measures, such as national registration measures,
would also vanish. All this should contribute to freer trade conditions for extra-EC
imports as well as for goods produced within the EC [GATT, 1993]. Therefore, the
For an earlier assessment with respect to EC protectionism against DCs, see Hiemenz et al.
(1990).15
subsequent list of remaining trade barriers concentrates on the protection against
imports from non-members of the EC. A distinction is made between European and
non-European trade partners. EC trade policies towards EFTA and Central and
Eastern Europe underwent significant changes recently. By contrast, protectionist
measures against non-European competitors are basically unchanged.
EC Trade Policies towards European Neighbours
European markets continue to be fragmented despite the fact that EC-EFTA
trade in manufactures is freed from tariffs and quantitative restrictions. Various
obstacles to market integration via trade persist [Abrams et al., 1990]:
- Some form of border control between the two blocs will be maintained, although
progress has been made in cutting the related administrative costs.
- Another concern of EFTA-based firms has been that they may become
vulnerable to anti-dumping actions by the EC, once price cuts are necessary to
remain competitive on EC markets.
- As stressed in the White Paper, a strong competition policy requires that
discipline on state aid is rigorously enforced. In practice, however, EFTA
countries complain about the EC for not meeting this requirement.
- Similarly, progress has been slow to ensure undistorted competition in public
procurement.
Since recently, several post-socialist countries in East Central Europe come
close to the favourable EFTA status [Langhammer, 1992a]. However, the Europe
Agreements with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland fall short of free trade
arrangements. EC concessions are most generous where a significant supply
response of East Central European countries is highly unlikely, e.g. for "non-
sensitive" manufactured goods the production of which is technology intensive. In
"sensitive" areas, the concessions boil down to a preferential market access of the
post-socialist countries over third countries. Trade diversion at the expense of the
latter will dominate over trade creation, since fundamental protectionist measures of
the EC remain in place. The best example is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
Quota restrictions are maintained for most agricultural products, though quotas will
be enlarged gradually. Furthermore, quota imports are not tax free. Restrictive health
standards, e.g. for potatoes, may further undermine the liberalisation of agricultural
imports from East Central Europe.16
In summary, trade diversion will dominate in the short run. But the overall
liberalisation effect may become stronger in the medium run. The Europe
Agreements have set a precedent for the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. The
concessions with regard to "sensitive" products, though limited, have somewhat
opened the door to highly protected EC markets. On these achievements the
beneficiaries may build when the EC's dilemma gains momentum, i.e. to open the
door further or to be confronted with mass migration.
Trade Barriers Against Non-European Competitors
While EC trade policy has changed significantly in a European context, the
considerable delay in concluding the Uruguay Round prevented major changes in
protectionism against non-European exports. Positively stated, "initial concerns that,
in the course of the single-market-program, the EC would turn inward-looking have
not been confirmed to date. There is little evidence of any recent major intensification
of protective measures on the part of the EC [GATT, 1991]. Negatively stated, high
barriers against non-European exports in "sensitive" sectors remained largely
unaltered, as did the main characteristics of EC trade policy, i.e. discrimination,
selectivity and discretion.
The first constant feature concerns the complex structure of preferential trade
arrangements. Apart from the afore mentioned trade preferences of EFTA and East
Central European countries, the EC offers duty-free access for manufactured exports
of the ACP countries, grants tariff preferences in the context of its Generalised
System of Preferences (GSP), and has established a network of special
arrangements with Mediterranean countries [Sideri, 1990].
The complex hierarchy of preferential arrangements is going to outlive the
Internal Market program, and presumably the Uruguay Round as well. The effects of
preferences on the EC's trade relations with the beneficiaries have been analysed
time and again, and so have the inherent protectionist traps in many of the
preference schemes. From the viewpoint of DCs, in particular, "serious criticism can
be levelled at the discrepancy between lofty objectives and numerous impediments
to free trade and security of access to the Community's market" [Pelkmans, 1987].
The second constant feature of EC trade policy relates to the traditionally
large differences in protection levels across sectors and industries. For a wide range
of industrial raw materials, fuels and manufactures, moderate tariffs are the main
factor affecting access to the EC market. In sharp contrast, a hard core of product17
areas has remained highly protected by an outstandingly complex trade regime, in,
e.g. agricultural products, textiles and clothing, and coal and steel [for details, see
GATT, 1991; Hiemenzet al., 1990].
The third constant feature of EC trade policy concerns the preferred
protectionist instruments, which reflect the EC's bias towards bilateralism, selectivity,
discrimination, and discretion. The most important NTBs continued to consist of
"voluntary" export restraints (VERs), EC surveillance, and anti-dumping procedures.
Not surprisingly, export restraints and similar measures were concentrated on
"sensitive" sectors. Some 50 bilateral restraint arrangements were known to be in
place by mid-1990, involving the EC, individual member countries, or their industries.
Japan, Asian NIEs, and state trading countries were the principal targets of export
restraints.
To summarise, it can be maintained that EC trade policy reveals a remarkable
propensity for sector specific interventions. Furthermore, strong elements of
discrimination and selectivity among trading partners have become entrenched in the
trade policy regime. All this has resulted in greater uncertainty among exporters with
respect to their access to EC markets.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Since the end of the 1980s, the external dimension of EC-1992 has extensively been
discussed for individual DCs, for groups of DCs as well as for DCs as a whole. DCs
could be seriously affected by EC-1992 because
- for a large number of them, the EC is either the largest export market or at least
an important outlet for domestic production;
- the majority of national quotas within the EC (including MFA quotas) applied to
products exported by DCs;
- the 1986 accession of Spain and Portugal as two countries with a resource
endowment similar to DCs may result in trade diversion.
With respect to the implications of EC-1992 for DCs, there are two major
questions. First, as concerns the trade effects, is trade diversion quantitatively more
relevant than additional import demand due to higher income in the EC (external
trade creation)? Second, will investment diversion occur in favour of the EC
periphery (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland) and to the detriment of DCs? In general,18
these issues cannot be satisfactorily addressed without referring to specific areas
and sectors. Differences among developing countries in specialisation profiles,
export potential and adjustment flexibility are large, and so are the consequences of
EC-1992 on sectors like agriculture, natural resources, manufactures and services.
Notwithstanding such differences, the following consequences for DCs as a
whole can be summarised:
First, no major trade diversion is expected for primary commodities simply
because of lacking domestic substitutes in the EC [Page, 1992; Koekkoek et al.,
1990]. Hence, the income effect will dominate the price effect, but given elasticities of
import demand below unity (except for fuels), the overall trade effect is assumed to
be small. The expected additional import demand following a five per cent EC GDP
growth is in the range of 2.5 per cent of total DCs
1 non-fuel primary commodity
exports in 1987 [Matthews, Me Aleese, 1990]. Effects could be smaller for products
for which EC competitive substitutes exist and higher for specific products such as
coffee and cocoa for which additional policy measures (such as a harmonization of
excise taxes) would fuel demand.
Second, exporters of manufactures may be more affected by trade diversion
than commodity exporters because of competing supply from the Mediterranean
member states, but they may also benefit more from the income effect. Which effects
will dominate has been open to controversies with respect to the appropriate income
elasticity of demand: Langhammer [1990] argues that the income effect will be larger
thant the trade diversion effect, whereas Davenport [1990] predicts a rough balance
between income and price effects. Assuming rather low elasticities, the total net
trade effects (the residual of income and trade diversion effects) have been
summarized for various regions as follows (in per cent of their exports to the EC):
ACP countries: 2.3 per cent; Mediterranean countries: 0.8 per cent; Maghreb
countries: 0.9 per cent; South Asian countries and China: -0.3 per cent; Asian NIEs: -
6.1 per cent; ASEAN countries: -0.3 per cent; Latin American countries: 1.3 per cent;
OPEC countries: 3.8 per cent; all DCs: 1.5 per cent [Davenport, 1990; Page, 1992].
The assumptions underlying these estimates clearly favour trade diversion over
trade creation. The estimates reflect the logic also inherent in the above-mentioned
CGE models: European integration benefits commodity producers and negatively
affects virtually all third country suppliers of manufactures. This result is of course
rather implausible if one does not accept that EC producers still can realise
substantial economies of scale in manufacturing industries such as textiles and19
clothing or iron and steel, in which DCs have achieved a high degree of international
competitiveness in the past.
Third, the effect of replacing national quotas by a Community-wide quota
leaving the total volume of imports unchanged is expected to impact but marginally
on DCs' exports of sensitive items [Davenport, 1990; Langhammer, 1990]. These
estimates critically depend on assumptions regarding import growth in formerly
constrained national markets and on the discipline in monitoring a Community-wide
quota. This discipline was much lower in large non-restricted markets such as
Germany under national surveillance (to the benefit of DCs), but could be stricter
under rules of Brussels.
Fourth, very little is known about the overall effects on DCs' exports of non-
factor services. The effects are likely to differ significantly between various segments
of the service sector. Because of the large amount of restrictions in the pre-1992
period the highest productivity gains are expected for business services, and
consequently this leads to higher "guestimates" for trade diversion. Such
"guestimates" hold for air transport where intra-EC prices are likely to decline and
where some DCs penetrated EC markets in the past. By contrast, gains for
developing countries are likely to arise in consumer services such as tourism,
especially when wage costs rise in the main EC tourist resorts.
4.1 Sectoral Implications
EC-1992 will induce structural change within the Community, and this structural
change will have implications for DCs. A number of specific industries seem to
provide cases in point. The list of industries includes textiles and clothing, electrical
machinery, automobiles and parts, iron and steel, and agricultural and food products.
These industries are important for DCs because these countries have already
become internationally competitive exporters of these products or are expected to
emerge as competitive suppliers in the near future, while EC trade policies reveal a
considerable propensity for sector specific interventions, especially against non-
European competitors. E.g., for most agricultural commodities the access to the EC
market is limited by an almost prohibitive system of variable levies and quotas.
Exports of textiles and clothing into the EC are limited by the EC's MFA system. In
the iron and steel industry, the ECSC Treaty allows for state subsidies until 2002 and
EC imports are limited by VERs, which, together with nationally administered
protectionist measures also dominate in the automobile industry. Similarly, anti-
dumping measures are used to restrict EC imports of consumer electronics. These20
trade restrictions must be borne in mind when the trade relations between the EC
and DCs, and the EC market shares of DCs in the EC are assessed.
Table 2 shows the trade flows between the DCs and the EC for selected
products in 1991, measured by EC imports (exports) from (to) DCs in per cent of
total EC imports (exports). EC import shares of DCs as a whole reveal that EC-1992
trade diversion effects can only be expected for textiles and clothing, electrical
machinery, and agricultural products where DCs account for a substantial fraction of
EC imports. For automobiles and iron and steel, EC imports from DCs are of minor
importance. Furthermore, certain subgroups of DCs will be affected differently by
sectoral effects, depending on the sectoral composition of trade with the Community.
E.g., Asian DCs
2 account for more than 70 per cent of EC imports of textiles and
clothing from DCs and for almost all EC imports of electrical machinery from DCs.
ACP and Latin American countries together account for roughly 60 per cent of EC
imports of agricultural products from DCs. Hence the potential sectoral impact of EC-
1992 on DCs, whatever its actual size may be, will have a strong regional component
(see section 4.2). To fully appreciate the expected sectoral implications of EC-1992,
a closer look at selected product categories may be useful.
Textiles and Clothing
Over the last two decades, a considerable restructuring process has taken place in
the textile and clothing sector world-wide. E.g., from 1975 to 1985 EC employment in
this industry fell by roughly 40 per cent, amounting to a loss of one million jobs
[Emerson et al., 1988]. In the textile industry, traditional methods of production were
readily adopted in many less developed and newly industrialising countries, and,
given their low wage costs, they became highly competitive in this labour-intensive
industry. One of the characteristics of textile technology is that there are few
obstacles to its diffusion to DCs. Given the existence of fierce international
competition in textiles for years, it is unlikely that the completion of the Internal
Market will greatly alter the competitive climate in the industry within the EC
[O'Donnell, 1989]. Put differently, because a considerable amount of specialisation
has taken place already, the scope for further exploitation of economies of scale
seems to be rather limited. The clothing industry has remained labour intensive
Excluding South Asian DCs; all Asian DCs together account for about 90 per cent of EC imports
of textiles and clothing.21
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because of the difficulty of automating and mechanising the key stages of
production. Therefore, economies of scale could not be realised to the same extent
as in the textile industry and labour costs have still an important impact on
competitiveness.
Taken together, all EC producers of textiles and clothing are threatened
especially by producers from DCs, partly because the production technology is easily
available, and partly because labour is an important cost factor [Hamilton, 1990]. As
a consequence, the manufacturing of large production runs has been shifted to DCs,
whereas the European producers have increasingly specialised in the manufacture22
of high quality and fashionable products. Thus, the ability to react to quickly
changing market conditions has become an important parameter of competitiveness,
whereas strategies based on mass production and concentration have lost ground in
the EC.
All EC imports of textiles and clothing have been subject to quantitative
controls [Davenport, 1991]. The criterion for intervention allowed under the MFA
refers to "market disruption", which has only been applied to low cost producers, and
that is, to DCs. Therefore, the DCs have a keen interest in the overall approach of
the Community towards the MFA. The debate on the effects of 1992 centres on one
particular issue: the impact of removing national quotas. As of 1 January 1993, each
meber state is entitled to issue import authorizations valid for the entire EC market.
Community surveillance will be ensured through a computer link between the
Commission and the competent national bodies [GATT, 1993]. It is expected that
EC-1992 will expose the Community's textile and clothing industry to greater import
competition, mainly for two reasons. First, the integrated market will, through free
circulation, permit full quota utilisation. Second, the transfer of quota management
responsibilities from national governments to the Community level will make it more
difficult for national industries to observe the actual level of imports from DCs, and
argue in favour of a national interest case [Cable, 1990],
There have been attempts to estimate the effects of abolishing member state
quotas while holding EC quotas at their 1987 level. By making use of alternative
assumptions on the increase in imports following the removal of a binding quota it
was concluded that overall exports of MFA goods from DCs could rise by 3-5 per
cent [Davenport, 1991]. The exporting countries that were found to benefit most
likely are Sri Lanka and Brazil, and possibly Peru, Thailand, and the Philippines. By
contrast, the ACP countries only hold a small share in EC imports of textiles and
clothing (see Table 2). Obviously, these countries have not gained from the lack of
formal MFA controls and from tariff preferences. It has been found that the principle
obstacles to ACP exports lie on the supply side, not in EC protection [Langhammer,
Amelung, 1989]. The conclusion is that the marginal erosion of ACP preferences
from eliminating member state quotas will have little impact. The only exceptions
may be Mauritius and Zimbabwe, which will have to compete more aggressively
where market access for lower cost producers has been restricted. Taken together,
for the DCs as a supplier of textiles and clothing, EC-1992 is expected to have an
overall positive, but relatively modest impact. EC quotas for many MFA products and
vis-a-vis some 30 or more countries will be applied until the late 1990s [Pelkmans,
1992], even if the Uruguay Round is successfully concluded. More substantial gains23
can be expected for specialised low cost producers which were restricted by the pre-
1993 system of national quotas.
Electrical Machinery
Broadly speaking, electrical machinery encompasses two rather different
subcategories: the skill-intensive production of computers and office equipment, and
the more traditional production of electrical and electronic consumer goods. While
the electronics industry in general is widely regarded as one of the growth industries
providing the inputs for future production technologies, the production of electrical
consumer goods in the EC is held to be a rather mature industry, with increasingly
declining international competitiveness relative to DCs, especially in Southeast Asia.
The reduction of trade costs as a result of EC-1992 is expected to impact on
both subcategories. Based on currently existing trade patterns,
3 it can be argued that
the implications for DCs could be more severe in the production of electrical and
electronic consumer goods. However, it is important to note that the industry as a
whole has already been subject to restructuring and transformation in the recent
past, partly independent of the foreshadowing of EC-1992. Therefore, the apparent
rapid structural change in electronics-related industries should be interpreted first of
all in the context of global competition for markets and technologies. That is, the EC-
1992 effects can be seen as simply supporting a restructuring of the EC electronics
industry which would also occur without EC-1992.
The main world-wide trends influencing the market for electrical machinery
are the rapid technological innovation and, as a result, the intensifying competitive
pressures. Historically, the industry has been rather fragmented into separate
branches such as electrical consumer goods, electronic components, computers and
office equipment, and telecommunication [Wong Poh Kam, 1991]. Beginning with the
microelectronics revolution, this has changed. The resulting increase of economies
of scope for producing related electronic products has led to a speed up of
integration of the separate sub-branches. Increasingly, most electronic products are
based on the use of very few standardised electronic components, reducing the rest
of the hardware to relatively simple products. Then, end products can be assembled
almost under conditions of mass production. Furthermore, the assembly process is
becoming automated by flexible manufacturing systems allowing for a wider range of
products to be manufactured using the same assembly line. In effect, this
development has led to a competitive edge of relatively large integrated firms.
3 For an analysis of ASEAN-EC trade in electronics see, Schmitt-Rink and Lilienbecker [1991].24
Another trend in the electronics industry is that software and system design
increasingly become the crucial bottle-neck skills, due to the advancing incorporation
of microprocessors which serve to enhance the information processing capacity of
final products. This increase in product complexity has led to a relatively high share
of research and development expenditures in the cost structures of the electronics
industry. The competition arising under these industry parameters has produced a
considerable shortening of the product life-cycle of technology-based
microelectronics products.
Taken together, process and product innovations made possible through the
availability of microprocessors have given rise to significant potential temporary
economies of scale. In turn, these economies of scale may have altered the
comparative advantage of firms. The share of European firms has steadily declined
in favour of suppliers from Japan and the Asian NIEs. EC-1992 is expected to
change this trend, at least partly. This may come true especially in sub-branches of
this industry where EC-1992 will facilitate the creation of harmonised technical
standards, thereby reducing the costs of interfacing and problems of non-
interoperability [Wong Poh Kam, 1991], E.g., in the case of telecommunication EC-
1992 makes possible the creation of EC-wide information technology infrastructures
for telephones, data transmitting, broadcasting, and other value-added services.
The trade policy effects of EC-1992 are relatively marginal in this industry. All
bilateral restrictions had been abolished by the end of 1992 and the only remaining
Community-wide quota applies to both South Korean exports of microwave ovens
and video tape recorders [GATT, 1991]. This does of course not preclude that the
EC will continue to apply anti-dumping actions against companies from DCs in a
protectionist way.
Automobiles*
The EC has become the largest regional automobile market in the world, accounting
for about 35 per cent of total world production. The other major producers are the
United States (20 per cent) and Japan (25 per cent). Within the EC, the automobile
industry is one of the largest manufacturing industries. It produces roughly 6 per cent
of the value added in EC manufacturing (almost 2 per cent of the Community's
GDP), and it employs about 7 per cent of the manufacturing workforce. Nearly 30 per
cent of production is exported, 90 per cent of which goes to other member states.
Approximately half of the total value of car production is accounted for by Germany.
4 This section draws on Emerson et al. [1988] and Hild [1991].25
The EC automobile market is dominated by about 10 large manufacturers. By
contrast, the components industry is much more fragmented. The value of
components produced in the EC accounts for 60 per cent of the value of car
production, and is highest in Germany and in France.
Within the EC, there exist a number of NTBs which are at least not
immediately expected to vanish as a result of EC-1992. Technical requirements
which must be fulfilled in order to get a registration permit for a specific type of car,
have not been fully harmonised. That is, up to now every car model needs a special
licensing for use on public roads, and therefore, automobile producers have to seek
type-approval in each member state. Differing VAT rates are regarded as a major
obstacle to intra-EC trade for consumers in Denmark, France, Italy, and the United
Kingdom. Probably the instrument that mostly contributes to a segmentation of
markets is the so-called "selective distribution system" agreed upon by all
manufacturers in the Community and authorised by the Commission in 1985 for a
period of 10 years. This system represents a network of exclusive dealing contracts.
Since end-1992, protectionist measures against imports from third countries
are only directed against Japan. Imports from DCs are granted tariff preferences
under the GSP if they meet the rules of origin requirements, and can therefore enter
the EC duty free. Meeting the rules of origin is crucial and at least in the South
Korean case, European suppliers contest that these requirements are met.
EC-1992 is expected to speed up the present process of restructuring and
technical change in the EC, both in the production of automobiles and in the
production of parts. Significant economies of scale are hoped to be achieved by the
widespread introduction of so-called "platforms", which combine certain features of a
production line and a flexible workshop. In effect, this reorganisation of production
permits both mass production and the production of differentiated products.
Computer aided design and integrated manufacturing (CAD, CIM), robotics, just-in-
time organisation and global or single sourcing are the main headings in this context.
Especially in the automobile industry, EC-1992 could be seen as a catalyst for
this restructuring process. Assuming that total production remains unchanged, it has
been estimated that savings in terms of total unit costs for the EC as a whole would
amount to 5 per cent, only because of the changes in the production technology
[Emerson et al., 1988]. The exploitation of economies of scale will have dynamic
effects: EC-competitiveness is enhanced, and more cars will be sold as lower
production costs will ultimately show up in lower consumer prices for cars. In turn,
the increase in production may give rise to further economies of scale, and,26
therefore, to a further stimulus to demand. The intensified competition may give rise
to mergers and production agreements within the EC, and possibly even outside the
EC. Of course, this neither means that economies of scale will only benefit EC-
originating firms, nor that economies of scale of the size expected can actually be
captured by European producers. Subsidiaries of Japanese companies, especially in
the UK, have proven to be even more competitive than EC-originating firms, at least
in some market segments.
The overall direct impact of EC-1992 on DCs in this industry will be negligible,
because to date, only single DCs (notably South Korea) are exporting cars to the EC
in small amounts. Hence, no substantial trade diversion effects should emerge.
Potential trade creation could result if suppliers from DCs could successfully
compete on EC markets. This may be the case in the production and sale of
compact small-size vehicles, in which advanced DCs such as the Asian NIEs and
Brazil or Mexico possess a comparative advantage.
Iron and Steel
Special characteristics of the European steel industry are the organisation in large
production units and the declining competitiveness vis-a-vis suppliers from third
countries. This may partly explain why this industry is one of the highly protected
industries in the EC: intra-EC steel production benefits from aid provided by national
governments, authorised by the Commission. While the system of managed
production quotas has been abolished in July 1988, at present the Commission
monitors trends in current imports to identify any "adverse" effects on the EC steel
industry. A range of primary and semi-manufactured products from non-EFTA
sources is subject to prior surveillance. In August 1992 the EC imposed unilateral
quotas on certain imports from the CSFR. Various national import restrictions were
replaced by Community quotas. According to the Commission, in late 1992 no steel
imports were subject to VERs [GATT, 1993]. A new sectoral support regime,
introduced in 1991, continued the granting of aid to the steel industry in the period
1992-96 to four broad subject areas: research and development, environmental
protection, partial or total cessation of production, and investments in certain EC
regions. All other forms of aid were prohibited [GATT, 1993]. The future of this
industry actually depends on the emerging Community market regime, rather than on
the completion of EC-1992 per se.
At present, the steel market has become increasingly oversupplied, due to the
world-wide recession and the simultaneous intensification of competition, especially27
from Central and Eastern European sources seeking new markets. Conceptionally,
the deep structural crisis in the steel industry can be best understood in terms of
industrial organisation and possible pricing strategies in this sector [Weiss
et al., 1988]. Technology in most steel-making operations has become relatively
ubiquitous, and the economic success of so-called mini-mills suggests that optimal
plant size has tended to fall. Hence, technology for steel making seems to be fairly
easy to obtain, and possibilities for low-scale entry seem to exist [Brown and Me
Kern, 1987]. If there are sunk costs associated with entering steel making, they are
likely to be relatively low. If this description of the steel industry holds, excess profits
can not emerge as long as there are no protectionist barriers to entry. Theoretically
speaking, if fixed costs in the steel industry are low enough, the contestability
[Baumol et al., 1982] of the steel market would converge to perfect competition; and
if fixed costs are high enough, one firm would serve the whole market, but this
monopolist could earn no rent because the threat of entry would force him to charge
no more than average costs for his product. Put differently, with the higher
competitiveness of NIEs and other DCs in the production of steel due to lower wage
costs and easy access to the production technologies [UNCTAD, 1990], the state
support for the steel industry in the EC has resulted in a great deal of excess
capacity.
In the words of the EC, the strategy of state support to the steel industry is an
"orderly" run-down of obsolete and non profitable production capacity, which is
accompanied by a modernisation policy and a policy for monitoring the installation of
new capacity. Notably German producers lost market shares from 1980 to 1988, not
because of a relative loss of competitiveness, but as a result of interventions of the
Commission under the system of managed production quotas. The capacity problem
has not yet been resolved. In the Commissions' opinion, there are still some 30
million tonnes (roughly 15 per cent) of spare capacity [Emerson et al., 1992] with
possible employment effects in the order of 50,000 [GATT, 1993].
Since EC-1992 is generally expected to reduce or even eliminate production
inefficiencies by achieving full market integration, it becomes clear why model
simulations intended to capture these effects generally predict large production
increases in iron and steel as a consequence of EC-1992 (see section 3.2). The
motivation for this line of reasoning seems to come from estimates that show
somewhat lower internal steel prices in the Community than in the other two large
iron and steel using regions of the world economy, namely Japan and the United28
States [Emerson et al., 1988].
5 This reasoning may be flawed, however, because of
the subsidisation of the European steel industry.
Furthermore, competitive suppliers of iron and steel have emerged in DCs.
The world-wide shifts in comparative advantage towards DCs can be seen from the
increase in their share of world steel exports from 3.4 per cent in 1975 to 11.2 per
cent in 1987 [UNCTAD, 1991]. The main DC exporters are Brazil and South Korea,
both identified to be low labour cost producers [Fischer, Nunnenkamp et al., 1988].
These highly competitive producers will be denied access to the EC even after 1992,
as was mentioned above. EC-1992 will not bring an abolition of "production
assistances" and, therefore, will not reduce existing inefficiencies. The predicted
production increase is not plausible as long as excess capacities continue to exist,
which can be considered obsolete when measured at world market prices.
Agricultural and Food Products
In the Community, agricultural production is mainly determined by the CAP. As a
consequence of EC-1992, a general dismantling of intra-EC border controls will
eliminate the system of border taxes and subsidies called monetary compensatory
amounts (MCA), which so far guaranteed the existence of different national levels of
price support. In December 1987, the highest support price levels for the average of
all agricultural products prevailed in Germany and the Netherlands (7 per cent above
the Community's average), and the lowest prices prevailed in the United Kingdom
and in Greece (12 and 38 per cent below the average) [Matthews and McAleese,
1990]. As a consequence, many EC markets for temperate-zone agricultural
products are virtually impossible for third countries to penetrate.
The total impact of these policy interventions, i.e., the total economic costs of
the CAP have been estimated in terms of producer subsidy equivalents (PSE) and
consumer subsidy equivalents (CSE) [Emerson et al., 1988]. The former (PSE) is
defined as the payment that would be necessary to compensate farmers for the loss
of income resulting from the removal of support policies; and the latter (CSE)
measures consumption foregone as a result of artificially high prices for agricultural
products. In the EC there are large transfers from consumers and taxpayers to
producers in the range of 3 per cent of GDP. The loss of economic welfare is about 1
per cent of GDP, which reflects that not all the transfers by consumers and taxpayers
end up as additional income for producers. Put differently, average net percentage
In 1988, all three suppliers together accounted for about 45 per cent of world steel production
(UNCTAD, 1991].29
PSEs for the sector as a whole of close to 50 per cent in 1990 and 1991 indicate that
about one-half of EC farm revenue results from policy intervention, either through
border restrictions or by financial assistance [GATT, 1993]. Subsidy equivalents and
welfare losses will not be reduced to zero because of EC-1992. It would be politically
unreasonable to assume that public price or income support will be eliminated
completely. This is not intended by the EC-1992 program. Therefore, DC exports of
agricultural products will hardly be facilitated in the future.
The principle barriers to trade within the EC in the food-processing industry
included restrictions on the use of specific ingredients, regulations with respect to the
content and description of products (e.g., purity law on pasta in Italy), packaging and
labelling requirements (e.g., recyclable containers), specific taxation (e.g. on beer in
the United Kingdom) and specific bureaucratic import restrictions. The net direct
benefit from the elimination of such non-tariff barriers has been estimated at 2-3 per
cent of this industry's total value added [Emerson et al., 1988]. Direct benefits are
very heavily concentrated on 10 products, the most important ones being beer,
pasta, and vegetable fats. Intra-EC trade is predicted to grow; e.g., imports are
estimated to increase by about 3-5 per cent of consumption in the case of pasta in
Italy and in the case of beer in Germany. Indirect effects stem from the increase in
competition, that will lead to a reorganisation of production. In contrast to US
companies, European food companies generally operate on a much more limited
scale, mainly because they are largely oriented towards their national markets.
Hence, the removal of non-tariff barriers should initiate an adjustment process which
will lead to an increase in specialisation of the large European food companies, as
well as a wider spread of their activities in Europe.
The abolition of intra-EC border controls for agricultural products was
combined with a harmonisation of tight veterinary and phytosanitary rules. Controls
of all products shall be limited to the place of departure, whereas the verification of
certificates will be made at the place of destination. The DCs worry that their exports
to the Community will be adversely affected by the introduction of such harmonised
technical standards as part of EC-1992. Those most likely to cause problems
concern DCs' exports of plants, fish, and meat [Davenport, 1991].
In the case of plant health, each shipment cleared at the EC border will be
issued with a "plant passport" which will guarantee free circulation throughout the
Community. There also exists the possibility of negotiating pre-export inspection.
Such tightening of product standards is most likely to impact on exporters of tropical
timber, planting material, and cut flowers. With respect to animal health and hygiene,30
which refers to (potential) EC-imports of fresh meat, the extra-EC slaughterhouses
and processing plants must be licensed by EC inspectors.
Probably those EC-1992 standards with the greatest impact on DCs, concern
fish and related products. Under the new regime, the Commission will formulate
specific conditions for the import of such products. These conditions may include a
list of plants and factory vessels which are authorised to export to EC markets. From
the point of view of DCs, these conditions seem to be very demanding and,
obviously, exhibit some discretionary leeway with respect to non-authorisation. An
additional effect comes from the fact that in the context of NAFTA, the United States
administration could possibly copy these tighter standards. The list of countries that
are likely to suffer from more demanding import standards for fishery products
includes Mediterranean, African, and Southeast Asian suppliers.
The EC market for fish is also a special case because contrary to the situation
for many farm products, the EC is a net importer of fish. In principle, tariffs are the
sole means of external protection. For the next four years, however, imports of
certain canned sardine and tuna varieties have been made subject to Community
quotas. Faced with a sharp increase of cheap imports in early 1993, the EC made
the release for free circulation of various fish categories subject to the importers'
compliance with the reference prices. In case significant quantities enter the EC
market at prices below these reference prices, the EC may revoke autonomous tariff
suspensions, make importation subject to compliance with the reference price, or
introduce counteracting charges (if compatible with existing GATT bindings) [GATT,
1993].
There are a number of tropical products exported by DCs where EC-1992 is
expected to have a substantial impact. Bananas
6 are the most prominent case. EC-
1992 will have an impact on the structure of the Community's banana imports, simply
because the import policies operating before January 1st 1993 can no longer be
maintained. World exports of bananas are dominated by Latin American suppliers,
roughly accounting for 70 per cent of world exports; exports from ACP countries and
from EC overseas territories account for about 15 per cent. Up to now, less than half
of the EC's consumption originates from ACP countries and the Community itself, the
other half being so-called dollar-bananas almost entirely from Central and South
America. These EC imports of dollar-bananas are subject to specific intra-EC
arrangements, designed to protect former colonies of EC member countries.
Guaranteed markets for bananas from the English speaking Caribbean and from
6 See, e.g., Borell and Yang [1992], Cable [1990], Davenport [1991], and Matthews [1992].31
Surinam existed in the United Kingdom; the same held for imports from French
overseas departments, Cameroon, and Cote d'lvoire in France, and from Somalia in
Italy. Greece, Spain, and Portugal restricted (or prohibited) imports of bananas other
than from Crete, the Canaries, and Madeira.
For a number of ACP countries and overseas territories of the Community,
bananas represent a significant share of total merchandise exports. The privileged
position of these ACP and EC suppliers depended on the exclusion of intra-EC
banana trade. Insulated intra-EC banana markets were made possible by the
frequent recourse to Article 115. Hence, any opening of the intra-EC market for
bananas could be expected to worsen the position of ACP and EC suppliers. This
explains why the Community has implemented an EC-wide tariff and a quota for
dollar-banana imports (effective since 1 July 1993), since a free German banana
market as before would have meant a free EC-wide banana market as a
consequence of EC-1992.
7 It has been estimated that even if the overall quota for
dollar-bananas were set at the average level of imports over some base period, the
ACP/EC banana suppliers would not be able to preserve their earlier privileged
positions [Davenport, 1991]. More dramatically, model simulations predict that
banana exports from favoured exporters will decline by 50 per cent under free trade,
and even under the protection of a tariff of 20 per cent on dollar-banana imports,
their exports will decline by almost 30 per cent [Borell and Yang, 1992]. Without
substantial increases in their productivity, which is hardly to be expected in the short
run, and in the absence of additional restrictions, ACP banana producers will lose as
a consequence of EC-1992, and dollar-banana producers will gain. These results
will, of course, not be realised if the implemented binding dollar-banana quota will
not be challenged by the GATT.
A similar situation emerges in the case of sugar. Here, potential difficulties for
DCs do not directly arise from EC-1992, but should be taken into account especially
by producers in the Caribbean who enjoy a quota at a fixed EC supported price
under the EC-ACP Sugar Protocol, notably Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, St.
Kitts, Surinam, and Trinidad [Stevens, 1991]. Part of the problem originates from the
dependence of the Sugar Protocol on the maintenance of a genuine demand for
cane sugar in the Community. To date, this demand is primarily originating from
Britain, where most ACP sugar is refined. With EC-1992, and especially with the
For a Community-wide quota of 2 million tonnes the duty was set at 100 ECU per tonne (20 per
cent). Imports exceeding the quota will be subject to a (prohibitive) duty of 850 ECU/tonne
(approximately 170 per cent). At present, EC imports from Latin America exceed the quota
agreed upon by 300,000 tonnes. It remains to be seen, however, whether this decision will be
challenged within the GATT.32
completion of the Channel Tunnel, it will be much cheaper to move beet sugar from
continental Europe to the United Kingdom. As a consequence, the cane sugar
exporters would have to accept a cut in price, or the cane refiners would have to go
out of business. While it is generally expected that low-cost ACP sugar exporters
could live with a (moderate) price cut, the high-cost Caribbean producers probably
could not. Hence, the reason for the sugar problem is not only to be found in EC
policies, but rather in the lack of competitiveness of the Caribbean exporters.
Other tropical products for which EC-1992 was expected to have an impact on
DCs exports are coffee, cocoa, tobacco, and tea. The concern for these commodities
came from the anticipated EC harmonisation of indirect taxation, i.e., the
harmonisation of excise taxes. In some member states these taxes are substantial,
reaching almost 50 per cent on coffee and tea in Germany, and 15 per cent in
Denmark, while there are zero rates in the United Kingdom, France, and the
Netherlands [Cable, 1990]. Up to now, these products have been excluded from tax
harmonisation in the single market context [GATT, 1993]. Tax evasion through
purchase in other member states can not longer be limited through border controls,
however.
Tobacco might provide a case for an overall negative impact of EC-1992.
Since there seems to exist a majority preference in the Community for "levelling-up"
some health standards, the Commission decided to gradually harmonise the excise
duties upwards, obviously not only because of health, but also because of revenue
concerns. This strategy will have severe consequences for tobacco exporters. If
excise tax rates were to be harmonised on the average of the four highest rates
(Germany, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom), the EC average rate would more
than double, resulting in an expected reduction of EC imports from DCs of about 4
per cent [Davenport, 1991]. Taking into account the partial compensation by an
increase of DC tobacco exports to the rest of the world due to declining world market
prices, it has been estimated that Brazil, Zimbabwe, India and Malawi will have to
face the overwhelming part of the losses.
4.2 Regional Implications
Most of what has been said about the implications of EC-1992 on primary commodity
exporters holds for Sub-Saharan Africa, which is still almost exclusively
concentrating on commodity exports [Langhammer, Amelung, 1989]. While some
income-induced additional demand for commodities could benefit African exporters
in the short run, the medium-term perspectives look gloomy. EC-1992 will probably33
accelerate the ongoing delinking of commodity consumption from economic growth
in Europe. This may further lower income elasticities for goods which are primarily
exported by Africa. Stricter environmental rules in Europe may also impact negatively
on Africa because the continent's supply consists of a large number of environment-
intensive goods such as phosphates, tropical timber, bauxite etc. [Tovias, 1990]. As
far as manufactured exports are concerned, African countries have to face an
erosion of their trade preferences granted in the Lome Convention because of the
Europe Agreements of the EC with the three Central European countries (see
section 2.4).
To some extent, the consequences for Latin America are similar to those for
Africa because of overlaps in the commodity supply. Specific policy measures for
Latin American exports only exist for some agricultural products such as bananas,
coffee, cocoa, sugar and rum. The final shape of EC policies in these areas is still
being negotiated. The banana case indicates that the EC appears to be determined
to protect the special interests of associated ACP countries. Any preservation of ACP
trade preferences will be detrimental to other Latin American suppliers.
Within manufactures which figure much less prominantly in Latin American
exports to the EC (20 per cent of total exports to the EC), Latin American exporters
of "hypersensitive" textiles might gain after the national quotas have been scrapped,
but compared to Asian suppliers they are unlikely to be among the major
beneficiaries. As few items (such as shoes) dominate in their export supply, they
even stand to lose if the trading patterns of Germany (being by far the major buyer of
Latin American manufactures) change in favour of Central and Eastern Europe and
other developing areas. With respect to investment flows, Latin America's
longstanding role as a preferred host of German investment in DCs [Agarwal, Gubitz,
Nunnenkamp, 1991] may suffer because export-oriented investment in
manufacturing outside the EC faces a better macroeconomic background in East
and Southeast Asia (including China) and - pushed by special investment incentives
- increasingly in Central and Eastern Europe.
In summarising, stagnant trade flows with Europe and the relatively income-
inelastic export supply of Latin America do not make the region a prime candidate for
medium-term gains from EC-1992. Given the emergence of regional integration
schemes in the Western Hemisphere (NAFTA, Enterprise of the Americas Initiative)
and the early success of Mexico to attract foreign capital, there is much reason to
assume a further deepening of trade relations within the Western Hemisphere rather
than between the EC and Latin America.34
EC imports from East and Southeast Asia primarily consist of manufactures.
These products accounted for 86 per cent of their total exports to the EC in 1990.
For this reason, the assessment on EC-1992 effects on East and Southeast Asia is
ambivalent. Estimated trade effects depend on the assumptions made with respect
to productivity gains in European manufacturing industries. If these gains were high,
trade diversion effects would be sizeable in the short run. This is reflected in the
estimated net trade loss of 6.1 per cent of the NIE's exports to the EC mentioned
already. An alternative view is that productivity gains will be small in those
manufacturing industries in the EC which had already lost their international
competitiveness in the past. In this case, East and Southeast Asian countries could
exploit their proven high capability for structural change and adjust their export
supply, including services, to changing demand patterns in the EC. Therefore, the
medium-term prospects for these countries would be positive.
Even some proponents of high trade diversion effects [Page, 1992] admit that
the second scenario is more plausible, at least in the medium term. First, the
estimated efficiency gains of EC suppliers appear to be on the high side in light of
the unrestricted international competition in most manufacturing industries. Second,
highly protected industries such as iron and steel or shipbuilding may react to market
integration by closing down or relocating production sites outside the EC rather than
by attempting to realise productivity increases within the EC. And third, export supply
from East and Southeast Asia is focussed on sectors for which relatively low internal
productivity gains were forecasted (i.e. labour-intensive manufactures). These
observations support the tentative conclusion that EC integration to a single market
by 1993 is likely to open up substantial new export opportunities for suppliers from
the Asian region which are not eroded by trade diversion [Hiemenz, Langhammer,
1991].
5. CONCLUSIONS
European economic integration is a continuous process which is likely to extend well
into the next millennium. The establishment of a Common Market in 1993 marks an
important stage of integration since the removal of border controls, harmonised
technical norms and standards, the liberalisation of trade in services and the free
movement of factors of production are expected to offer opportunities to increase
production, to exploit economies of scale and to improve the allocation of resources.
The resulting productivity gains would strengthen the internal and external
competitiveness of EC firms. Suppliers from non-member countries may be
negatively affected because of the fiercer competition and the higher attractiveness35
of locations in Europe for internationally mobile capital, but they may also benefit
from income-induced demand growth. It is important to note that economic
integration so far was not accompanied by a deteriorating access to European
markets for third country suppliers, i.e. fears of an emerging Fortress Europe have
not materialised.
In addition to integration deepening, the economic landscape of Europe is
changed by integration widening. The EFTA countries are joining the EC in the
European Economic Space (EES). Further applicants are the formerly socialist
Central European countries with which the EC has negotiated a time schedule for
bilateral free trade in the framework of the Europe Agreements. Somewhat less far-
reaching agreements were also offered to the East European countries, including the
former USSR. These new arrangements imply an erosion of trade preferences
granted to DCs and could result in trade and investment diversion away from DCs
since Central and Eastern European countries possess a factor endowment similar
to many DCs. However, supply constraints will prevent Central and Eastern
European countries from exploiting their advantages on EC markets in the short and
medium term.
Concerning non-European countries, the EC is maintaining its complex
hierarchy of preferential trading arrangements with important protectionist remnants
in sensitive sectors such as agriculture, iron and steel, textiles and clothing, and
cars. On the other hand, there are hardly any restrictions on non-sensitive
manufactured imports from these countries. National quotas and VERs have been
replaced by EC-wide regulations, but the trade policy stance of the EC towards non-
European countries has otherwise remained unchanged.
Internal adjustments in the EC determine the impact of the 1992 program on
third countries. The magnitude of the impact depends on the degree of association
with the EC, the extent of mutual trade relations, and the structure of production in
non-member countries. By these criteria, EFTA countries will be most affected by the
integration process. They have close trade ties with the EC, a comparable
production structure and preferential market access under the EES. General
equilibrium computations suggest a shift from physical capital-intensive to more skill-
intensive EFTA industries, while more labour-intensive industries would relocate to
the southern periphery of the EC. As a result, EFTA countries can enjoy substantial
income gains in an EES setting. Because of the remaining trade barriers, these gains
would be even larger in the case of full membership.
DCs have been particularly worried by the 1992 program since the EC
absorbes more than a third of their total exports. A number of partial and general36
equilibrium estimates of trade effects for DCs show that net trade effects (the
residual of trade diversion and income induced trade creation) crucially depend on
the assumptions about EC substitutes and market structures. Most models assume
lacking EC substitutes for primary commodities and the existence of unexploited
economies of scale virtually in all manufacturing industries. The logical consequence
is an estimated net trade loss of all DCs taken together amounting to 1.5 per cent of
total trade, with commodity exporters such as the ACP and Latin American countries
as net gainers and suppliers of manufactured exports such as the Asian NIEs as
heavy losers. The latter result does not appear to be plausible, however. It is derived
from trade diversion, primarily caused by economies of scale in labour and physical
capital-intensive industries, in which DCs have already proven to be competitive on
EC markets in the past. Analyses of individual manufacturing industries in the EC
suggest that there are reasons to expect that DCs can continue to exploit their
comparative advantages, in textiles and clothing, footwear, iron and steel, electrical
and electronic consumer goods, and automobile parts, since the respective markets
must be classified as perfectly competitive. In this scenario, income-induced demand
effects tend to overcompensate trade diversion not only for commodity producers,
but also for suppliers of semi-skilled and standardised manufactures such as the
Asian DCs. With the exception of agricultural economies specialized on specific
products, such as bananas, the net welfare effect of EC-1992 will, therefore, be
either positive or at worst zero for most DCs.37
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